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We examine optimal discount window policy in an economy with a linear
investment technology and aggregate liquidity shocks. Unrestricted lending
at the discount window prevents large shocks from causing banking crises,
but leads to indeterminacy of stationary equilibrium. We show how a policy
ofofferingdiscount-windowloansatanabove-marketinterestrategenerates
a unique stationary monetary equilibrium. Under such a policy, banking
crises occur with positive probability in equilibrium, but a proper choice of
interest rate can make the welfare loss due to these crises arbitrarily small.
We then modify the model by introducing diminishing returns to investment
and show that, in this case, the optimal policy may eliminate banking crises
entirely.
1 We are deeply indebted to Bruce Smith for his useful comments and for many years of encouragement and support.
We gratefully acknowledge ﬁnancial support from the Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public
Policy at Washington University. Part of this work was completed while Keister was visiting the University of Texas at
Austin, whose hospitality and support is also gratefully acknowledged.1 Introduction
The history of the U.S. banking system is characterized by recurrent episodes in which a short-
age of liquidity brought about a crisis and a distortion in the allocation of resources that was be-
lieved to have been to some extent avoidable.
2 These episodes have led to a belief that the smooth
and proper functioning of the banking system requires the total supply of currency to change in
response to short-term ﬂuctuations in the demand for liquid assets. In fact, one of the main reasons
given for the founding of the Federal Reserve System, as stated in the title of the Federal Reserve
Act of 1913, was “to furnish an elastic currency.” One way of providing an elastic currency is
through discount window lending; the monetary authority can offer short-term loans of currency
to banks that present illiquid assets as collateral. The terms at which such loans are offered have at
least two important effects on the potential scope for liquidity-induced banking crises. First, they
h a v ead i r e c ti m p a c to nt h es e v e r i t yo fac r i s i s ;t h ea vailability of credit essentially determines how
distorted real allocations can become once a crisis is underway. Second, they affect the likelihood
of a crisis occurring at any point in time. This is because the terms at which credit will be avail-
able if a crisis occurs will inﬂuence the amount of liquidity that each bank chooses to hold in its
portfolio during “normal” times. This choice, in turn, affects the likelihood that the entire banking
system will run out of liquidity and slide into a crisis. In this paper we analyze these two effects
within a fully-speciﬁed general equilibrium model, and we derive their implications for optimal
discount window policy.
Anumberofexistingpapershaveshown, withinageneralequilibriumframework, howdiscount
window lending can facilitate the smooth functioning of the banking system and thereby lead to
better equilibrium allocations. In Sargent and Wallace [14], for example, the demand for credit
ﬂuctuates deterministically and there is a legal restriction on the issue of private credit instruments.
In this environment, having a discount window that offers loans at a zero nominal interest rate
leads to the existence of a Pareto optimal equilibrium, while closing the discount window does not.
2 See, for instance, the examples described in Champ, Smith, and Williamson [5] and Freeman [9]. Additional
historical information on banking crises in the U.S. can be found in Friedman and Schwartz [11], but we should
emphasize that interest in the topic is not solely historical. A comprehensive discussion of modern banking crises
around the world is provided by Boyd et al. [4].
2Note that a zero nominal interest rate implies that acquiring liquidity is costless, since currency
yields the same return as real (illiquid) assets. Freeman [9] focuses on the role of liquidity in the
payments system and shows that attaining an optimal allocation requires the monetary authority
to lend sufﬁc i e n tc u r r e n c yi ne a c hp e r i o dt ok e e pt h en o m i n a li n t e r e s tr a t ea tz e r o .
3 Williamson
[18] examines a model with moral hazard where discount window loans can only be made against
certain types of assets. The loans that are made again carry a zero nominal interest rate, which
minimizes the likelihood of a banking crisis caused by a shortage of liquidity. The important
feature common to the environments in these papers is that having a discount window provide
costless liquidity improves equilibrium allocations. However, a recent paper by Smith [16] points
to a potential danger of following such a policy: it can lead to a “massive” indeterminacy of
equilibrium.
4 The desirability of operating a discount window is then ambiguous; it depends on
which of the inﬁnitely-many equilibria would be selected if a discount window were opened.
We begin by studying the same physical environment as Smith [16]. There is an inﬁnite se-
quence of two-period lived, overlapping generations of agents. A linear investment technology can
be used to transform one unit of young-period consumption into a greater amount of old-period
consumption. This investment can be liquidated early, but only at a loss. There is also a stock of
government-issued ﬁat currency. An agent is assigned to one of two physically-separated locations
at birth, and in each period a fraction of young agents is randomly selected and forced to move to
the other location. This fraction is itself a random variable, and is independent across periods. The
stochastic relocations in this model act like the portfolio-preference shocks commonly employed
in the literature on bank runs,
5 and banks arise to insure consumers against such uncertainty. Banks
take deposits and divide their portfolio between currency and investment. Limited communication
prevents claims on speciﬁc agents from being traded across locations, and therefore generates a
transactions role for currency. Relocated agents must carry with them either currency or liqui-
dated investment. Fluctuations in the number of relocated agents across periods can therefore be
interpreted as ﬂuctuations in liquidity demand.
3 A later paper, Freeman [10], adds aggregate ﬁnancial shocks and compares zero-nominal-rate discount window
lending with other ways of providing an elastic currency. See also Schreft and Smith[15], which shows how discount
window lending can be superior to open market operations as a policy tool.
4 Smith and Weber [14] study a related environment and show how having an elastic currency generated by private
banknote issue can also lead to massive indeterminacy of equilibrium.
5 See, for example, Diamond and Dybvig [7] and the recent papers by Peck and Shell [13] and Ennis and Keister
[8].
3When there is no discount window, Smith [16] identiﬁes a fundamental tension between the
stability of the banking system and the efﬁciency of equilibrium allocations. When the nominal
interest rate is positive, banks perceive an opportunity cost of holding cash reserves and therefore
economize on such holdings. As a result, the banking system is relatively illiquid and there are re-
current crises in which bank reserves are exhausted and a currency premium emerges. These crises
can be avoided entirely if the monetary policy generates a zero nominal interest rate. However,
when the nominal interest rate is zero, there is no opportunity cost of holding cash and therefore
banks hold sufﬁcient reserves to meet any possible level of liquidity demand. In other words,
banks voluntarily become narrow banks and thereby lose their intermediary function. This implies
that socially-productive investments are not undertaken and the resulting equilibrium allocation is
far from optimal. The underlying source of this tension is that socially-productive investment is
illiquid, but agents who are relocated need access to liquid assets. Hence this seems like precisely
the type of environment where discount window lending would be a useful policy tool. If, after
observing the fraction of agents to be relocated, banks could obtain loans of currency, using their
real investments as collateral, they could continue to serve their intermediary function and at the
same time crises caused by a shortage of liquid assets could be averted. However, Smith [16]
shows that opening a discount window in this environment leads to the existence of a continuum
of stationary equilibria, for the following reason. When a bank has access to liquidity at a zero
nominal interest rate, it is indifferent between holding liquid assets and making real investments.
As a result, any division of banks’ portfolios between currency and investment is consistent with
equilibrium and hence there are inﬁnitely many (stationary) equilibria, each with a different level
of real investment. Some of these equilibria generate higher welfare than closing the discount win-
dow, but others generate lower welfare. In other words, the model does not give clear guidance
as to whether or not a discount window should be opened. Perhaps the best statement that can be
made is that opening a discount window is a “dangerous” policy.
In this paper, we expand the set of discount window policies under consideration and look for an
optimal policy in the expanded set. In particula r ,w em o v ea w a yf r o mt h ef o c u so naz e r on o m i n a l
interest rate and allow the monetary authority to set an interest rate at the discount window that
is anywhere between the market nominal rate of interest and inﬁnity (in which case the discount
windowiseffectivelyclosed). Weshowthataslongastheinterestratechargedondiscountwindow
4loans is higher than the market rate, there is a unique stationary equilibrium in which money
has value. In other words, a discount window can be opened without generating indeterminacy
as long as borrowing from the discount window is more expensive than holding cash reserves.
6
However, having a “penalty rate” on discount window loans implies that banking crises will occur
in equilibrium, with the frequency and severity of the crises being determined by the size of the
penalty. We ask what policy is optimal in terms of generating the highest level of steady-state
welfare. We show that penalty-rate policies can be used to generate equilibrium allocations that are
arbitrarily close to the ﬁrst-best allocation, but that no policy can actually implement the ﬁrst-best
allocation. The near-optimal policies entail having low nominal interest rates and nearly-costless
liquidity at the discount window.
We then show that the non-existence of an optimal policy is an artifact of the assumption that
the return on investment is exactly linear. We replace the investment technology with a standard
model of production, thereby bringing the model into the Diamond [6] framework and introducing
diminishing returns to investment. Continuing to focus on stationary equilibria, we show that if the
diminishing returns are strong enough to create a store-of-value role for money, an optimal policy
does exist. This policy entails setting the nominal interest rate to zero and providing discount
window loans at this market rate. This policy does not lead to the indeterminacy discussed in
Smith [16] precisely because the return on investment is endogenous; only one level of investment
will lead to the interest rate required for markets to clear. Hence, in this setting, the optimal
monetary policy is a combination of the Friedman rule with a costless-liquidity regime at the
discount window.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the details of
the basic model and describe in detail the optimal behavior of individual banks. In Section 3 we
describe the equilibria of the model under different policy regimes; we present the corresponding
welfare analysis in Section 4. In Section 5 we analyze the model with diminishing returns to
investment. Finally, in Section 6 we offer some concluding remarks.
6 The Federal Reserve System adopted a policy of charging above-market rates on discount window loans in January
2003. Previously, discount window loans were typically granted at below-market rates, with stringent requirements
employed to limit access to this credit. Interestingly, this type of policy was also advocated by Bagehot [2],w h o
argued that in times of crisis the monetary authority should act as a lender of last resort and lend freely to the banking
system, but “at a penalty rate.”
52T h e M o d e l
In this section we present the model of Smith [16] with the modiﬁcation that banks can borrow
from the discount window at a gross nominal interest rate φ. We brieﬂy describe the physical
environment, and then derive the optimal behavior of competitive banks in this environment.
2.1 The Environment
Consider an inﬁnite-horizon, overlapping-generations economy with spatial separation. Let t =
0,1,2,...index the (discrete) time periods. In each period, a continuum of identical agents with
unit mass is born in each of two locations. All agents live for two periods. There is a single
consumption good, and each agent is endowed with w>0 units of this good when young (and
nothing when old). Agents only care about consumption in the second period of life, and have the
utility function u(c)=l n( c). At t =0there is a continuum of old agents (also with unit mass) in
each location, each of whom is endowed with M0 units of ﬁat currency.
At the beginning of each period, young agents receive their endowments. At this point, agents
(and banks) cannot move between or communicate across locations, and therefore trade only oc-
curs among agents in the same location. Young agents can trade with old agents and can deposit
resources in a bank. It is straightforward to show that a young agent will choose to deposit all of
her income in a bank. After trade takes place, there is an opportunity to invest goods in a storage
technology. This technology transforms one unit of the period-t good into R>1 units of the
period t +1good. The other asset in the economy is money. In addition to potentially serving
as a store of value, money facilitates transactions made difﬁcult by spatial separation and limited
communication (as in Townsend [17]). A bank takes in deposits and allocates its portfolio between
currency and investment. Note that the storage technology is the only real investment available
in this economy. Goods that are neither consumed nor invested will perish once the investment
opportunity has passed.
Next, a fraction πt of young agents in each location is notiﬁed that they will be moved to the
other location. Goods invested in the storage technology cannot be transported between locations
unless the investment is ﬁrst liquidated. A unit of investment that is liquidated yields a return
of r<1. Limited communication prevents privately-issued liabilities, such as checks, from be-
ing veriﬁable in the other location. Currency, on the other hand, is universally recognizable and
6non-counterfeitable, and is therefore accepted in both locations. Movers are able to contact their
bank and withdraw currency and/or liquidated investment. Immediately afterwards, movers are
relocated and the next period begins. Movers use the currency they received from the bank to buy
consumption in their new location, and at this point all old agents consume and end their lifecycle.
The relocation probability πt is a random variable in each period. Since there is a continuum
of young agents, it represents both the probability of relocation for each agent and the fraction
of all agents who move. That is, πt gives the size of the aggregate liquidity shock in period t;
higher values of πt correspond to higher liquidity demand. It has support [0,1) and is drawn from
the twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing distribution function G with associated
density function g. It is independently and identically distributed over time.
2.2 Monetary Policy
The monetary authority has two policy variables, both of which are chosen once and for all in the
initial period. First, it sets a (gross) growth rate σ for the money supply, so that
Mt+1 = σMt (1)
holds. These monetary injections/withdrawals take place through lump-sum transfers to young
agents; let τt denote the real value of the transfer at time t.W ea s s u m et h a tσR ≥ 1 holds. In a
stationary equilibrium, σR will be the value of the nominal interest rate; hence we are ruling out
policies that would lead money to have a strictly higher return than investment. The qualitative
properties of equilibrium under such a policy would be very similar to the case where σR =1
holds; excluding these policies simpliﬁes the presentation without any loss of economic insight.
Second, the monetary authority sets a (gross) nominal interest rate φ > 1 on discount window
loans.
7 Note that this policy is always feasible in the sense that it requires no real resources from
the monetary authority regardless of how the price level changes over time. If, in period t,a
bank demands a loan of λt (measured in real terms, per unit of deposits), it goes to the discount
window and receives λtpt dollars, where pt is the general price level.
8 In the following period, the
bank must pay back φλtpt dollars. We assume that the monetary authority destroys λtpt of these
dollars and uses the remaining (φ − 1)λtpt to purchase goods. In this way, the stock of currency in
7 In Section 5 we relax this condition to φ ≥ 1.
8 Throughout the analysis, we only consider equilibria where money has value and hence pt is ﬁnite for all t.
7circulation continues to obey (1). We assume that agents derive no utility from the revenue earned
by the monetary authority through this lending policy. As will become clear later, if instead the
revenue were rebated to agents as a state-contingent, lump-sum payment, our main results would
not change. Such rebates complicate the derivations substantially, so we present the simpler case
here.
2.3 Banks
A young agent deposits her entire savings w + τt w i t hab a n k . T h eb a n kp r o m i s e sh e rar e t u r n
dm
t (πt) if she is relocated and a return dt (πt) if she is not. As the notation indicates, both of these
returns can depend on the size of the aggregate liquidity shock. It is assumed that banks behave
competitively in the sense that they (i) take the real return on assets as given and (ii) choose the
deposit return schedules dm
t and dt to maximize the expected utility of young lenders. Per unit of
deposits, the bank acquires an amount γt of real money balances and invests the remaining 1−γt.
Afractionδt ofthisinvestmentisliquidatedearlyandgiventomoverswhiletheremaining(1 − δt)
is held until maturity and given to non-movers. In addition, the bank borrows a non-negative (real)
amount λt from the discount window. The bank faces two constraints on the return schedules it can
offer. First, relocated agents must be given currency or liquidated investment. Let αt (πt) denote
the fraction of the bank’s reserves that are given to movers. Using the fact that the return to holding










must hold. The second constraint is that payments to non-movers cannot exceed the value of the
bank’s remaining portfolio – remaining cash reserves plus matured investment minus the repay-
ment of the discount window loan. Since the investment gives the gross real rate of return R,t h i s
constraint can be written as
(1 − πt)dt (πt)=[ 1− αt (πt)]γt
pt
pt+1




Banks maximize a typical depositor’s expected utility subject to these two constraints. Each bank
8will therefore choose the functions dm





t (π)(w + τt)] + (1 − π)ln[dt (π)(w + τt)])g(π)dπ
subject to (2) and (3). Let It = Rt (pt+1/pt) denote the (gross) nominal interest rate. That is,
It reﬂects the additional return that investment offers over currency, and hence represents the op-
portunity cost of holding cash reserves. Substitu t i n gi nt h et w oc o n s t r a i n t sa n dp e r f o r m i n gs o m e













(1 − π)ln[[1− αt (π)]γt +[ 1− δt (π)](1 − γt)It − λt (π)φ]g(π)dπ
subject to
0 ≤ γt ≤ 1, 0 ≤ αt (π) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ δt (π) ≤ 1, and
0 ≤ λt (π) ≤
1
φ
([1 − αt (π)]γt +[ 1− δt (π)](1 − γt)It) for all π.
Note that the fractions of currency reserves and investment paid out to movers, as well as the
amount of discount-window borrowing, are chosen after the realization of πt, while the fraction of
currency in the bank’s asset portfolio is chosen before the realization of πt. Hence we can solve
the problem backward, by ﬁrst ﬁnding the optimal values of αt, δt, and λt as functions of γt and
πt. That is, we can ﬁrst choose (αt, δt, λt) to
maximize πt ln
h






(1 − πt)ln[(1− αt)γt +( 1− δt)(1− γt)It − λtφ]
subject to the constraints above. We begin the process of solving this problem by showing that,
outsideof oneknife-edgecase, thebankmayrespondtohighliquiditydemandeitherbyliquidating
investment or by borrowing from the discount window, but not both.
Proposition 1 If φ <R / rholds, then the solution to (5) has δt =0for all values of γt and πt. If
φ >R / rholds, then the solution to (5) has λt =0for all values of γt and πt.
The proof of this proposition is contained in the appendix, but the intuition is straightforward.
Borrowing from the discount window and liquidating investment are both ways to generate ad-
9ditional consumption for movers as a group (at the expense of non-movers). Moreover, both of
these methods have a constant marginal cost, in that the amount of consumption taken away from
non-movers for each unit of consumption given to movers is independent of the quantity borrowed
or liquidated. Therefore, the bank will only use the less costly of the two methods. If the interest
rate at the discount window is low, then borrowing is less costly and banks will never liquidate
investment. If the interest rate at the discount window is high enough, however, then liquidation is
less costly and the discount window will be inactive. In the latter case, our model reduces to that
presented in Smith [16]. There is one borderline case that the proposition does not cover, when φ
is exactly equal to R/r. In this case the solution to (5) is not unique, because the bank is indifferent
between liquidating investment and borrowing from the discount window. In what follows, we will
largely ignore this knife-edge case in order to simplify the exposition. We show in section 4 below
that setting φ = R/r cannot be part of an optimal policy.
Using Proposition 1, we can break (5) into two cases and solve each one separately. When





















































γt +( 1− γt) It
φ
. (8)
When demand for liquidity is fairly low (the relocation shock is below a critical value π∗), the
bank is able to give movers and non-movers the sa m er e t u r nb yp a y i n go u to n l yaf r a c t i o no fi t s
reserves to movers. Since the bank wants to provide agents with insurance against the relocation
shock, this is the optimal thing to do. When the realization of the relocation shock is greater than
π∗, however, this is no longer feasible. In this case, there are so many movers that even if all of
the bank’s cash reserves are given to them, they will receive a lower return than the (relatively
10few) non-movers. Following Champ, Smith, and Williamson [5], we label such an event a banking
crisis. In a crisis, the bank has an incentive to borrow currency from the discount window so that
it can transfer resources from non-movers to movers. However, such borrowing is costly and, as a
result, the bank waits until the number of movers is above a second critical level π∗∗ before doing
any.
Some intuition for the range of inaction [π∗,π∗∗] can be gained by thinking about the set of
feasible ways for the bank to divide resources between movers (as a group) and non-movers (as
a group), once γt has been chosen. One action that is always feasible is to give all cash reserves
(which will be worth γt (pt/pt+1) in real terms next period) to movers and the return from all
investment (worth (1 − γt)R) to non-movers. If instead the bank wants to give fewer resources
to movers and more to non-movers (perhaps because there are very few movers this period), it
can do so on a one-for-one basis. That is, for every unit of future consumption (in the form of
currency) that is taken away from movers, exactly one unit is given to non-movers. Now suppose
that instead the bank wants to give more resources to movers and fewer to non-movers. In this
case the bank must either liquidate investment or obtain a loan from the discount window, so that
for every unit of additional consumption given to movers, non-movers must give up either R/r
or φ units. This difference in the rates of transformation is what leads to the range of inaction
[π∗,π∗∗] in the optimal levels of αt and λt. When there are very few movers, the optimal action
is to give almost all of the resources to non-movers and hence we are in the region where the rate
of transformation is unity. As we examine larger and larger realizations of πt, the solution gives
more and more of the bank’s currency reserves to movers. At πt = π∗, the optimal action reaches
the kink in the constraint set where all currency reserves are given to movers. This point remains
the optimal choice for a range of values of πt; only when the realization is greater than π∗∗ is it
optimal to move to the steeper-sloped part of the boundary. In conjunction with (8), this reasoning
also demonstrates how the interest rate on discount window loans determines the potential severity
of crises when φ <R / rh o l d s .T h em o r ec o s t l yi ti st ob o r r o w ,t h el a r g e rπt must be (and therefore
the larger the gap between the returns of movers and non-movers will be) before a bank starts
b o r r o w i n gt oe a s et h ec r i s i s .
We now proceed to solve for the optimal value of γt. To do so, we substitute the optimal values
of αt and δt into the bank’s objective function so that the only remaining variable to be determined




















Because borrowing is costly, the solution to this problem will be interior as long as 1 <I t < φ
holds. The ﬁrst-order condition is given by
It − 1


























This equation implicitly deﬁnes the solution to the bank’s portfolio allocation problem (recall that
γt appears in the expressions for π∗ and π∗∗ above) as a function of the variable It ∈ (1,φ).L e t
γφ (It) denote this solution, where the φ subscript indicates that the solution (i) applies in the
region of the parameter space where the discount window is active and (ii) depends on the interest
rate charged on discount window loans. The next proposition establishes some properties of this
solution.
Proposition 2 For any given φ ∈ (1,R/r) and any It > 0, the bank’s problem has a unique
solution. The reserve-deposit ratio γφ in this solution is a continuous function of It and satisﬁes:
(a) γφ (It)=1for It ≤ 1,
(b) γφ (It)=0for It ≥ φ, and
(c) γ0
φ (It) < 0 for It ∈ (1,φ).
The proof of this proposition is contained in the appendix; the intuition is again fairly straightfor-
ward. If It ≤ 1 holds, then the return on currency is at least a high as the return on investment.
Since currency offers the additional advantage of being liquid, banks will hold only currency. If
It ≥ φ holds, on the other hand, then borrowing from the discount window costs no more than
12holding cash reserves. The quantity of borrowing can be chosen after the demand for liquidity
is known, and therefore banks will hold no cash reserves. For intermediate values of It,b a n k s
will hold both types of assets, with the fraction of resources placed in currency being a decreasing
function of It.
We now examine the solution to the bank’s problem when φ >R / rholds. In this case, we
know from Proposition 1 that the discount window is inactive, and hence the problem is the same











































where π∗ is again given by (7) and we have
π =
γt




When 1 <I t <R / rholds, the optimal choice of γt is interior and is implicitly deﬁned by




Let γ` (It) denote this solution, where the ` subscript indicates that this solution applies in the
region of parameter space where liquidation takes places (and the discount window is inactive).
The following is a combination of our Proposition 1 with Proposition 3 in Smith [16].
Proposition 3 Given any φ >R / rand any It > 0, the bank’s problem has a unique solution.
The reserve-deposit ratio γ` in this solution is a continuous function of It and satisﬁes
(a) γ` (It)=1for It ≤ 1,
(b) γ` (It)=0for It > R
r , and
(c) γ0






Having solved the optimization problem of the bank, we turn to an analysis of general equilib-
rium.
133 Equilibrium
An equilibrium of this economy is characterized by the market-clearing condition for real bal-
ances. Since the supply of real money balances is equal to Mt/pt and the demand for real balances
comes entirely from banks, market clearing requires that we have
Mt
pt
=( w + τt)γt. (11)










Deﬁne zt ≡ Mt/pt to be the (per-capita) level of real balances in the economy. Then, if money has




























where the function γi i sg i v e nb ye i t h e rγφ or γ`, depending on the rate of interest charged at the
discount window. When φ >R / rholds, γi is given by γ` and this dynamical system is the same
as that studied by Smith [16]. When φ <R / rholds, however, γi is instead given by γφ and the
dynamical system is different.
Following Smith [16], we focus on stationary equilibria, where zt+1 = zt = z holds for all t. In




σ − (σ − 1)γi (σR)
. (12)
This expression demonstrates that a stationary equilibrium with valued ﬁat currency exists if and
only if γi (σR) > 0 holds. In other words, the monetary authority must set its two policies in such
14a way that banks demand a positive amount of reserves. Using Propositions 2 and 3, a necessary








hold. If (13) did not hold, either borrowing from the discount window or liquidating investment
would be a cheaper way of providing liquidity than holding cash reserves. The demand for cash
reserves would then be zero and money would have no value. In addition, (12) demonstrates that,
when (13) holds, there is a unique positive level of real money balances consistent with stationary
equilibrium. Again referring back to Propositions 2 and 3, we see that the stationary monetary
equilibrium allocation will therefore be unique except in the knife-edge case where φ = R/r holds
and the bank is indifferent between borrowing and liquidating. We summarize these results in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 If (13) holds, there exists a unique positive stationary equilibrium level of real
money balances. In addition, as long as φ 6= R/r holds, there is a unique stationary monetary
equilibrium allocation.
In a sense, this statement is the central result of the paper. Discount window lending does not
lead to indeterminacy of stationary equilibrium in this environment if discount window loans carry
a “penalty” rate of interest. This result contrasts strongly with that reported in Smith [16] for
t h ec a s ew h e r eφ =1holds. When the net nominal interest rate at the discount window is zero,
borrowing from the discount window has the same cost as does holding cash reserves. However,
borrowing has the advantage that the quantity can be chosen after the bank observes how many
depositors are moving. Therefore the bank will be unwilling to hold any cash reserves unless there
is no opportunity cost of doing so, that is, unless It =1holds. If It =1holds, however, the
bank is completely indifferent between holding reserves and borrowing from the discount window,
and this indeterminacy in the solution to the bank’s problem translates in t oa ni n d e t e r m i n a c yo f
equilibrium prices and allocations. When φ >I t holds, however, borrowing from the discount
window is more costly than holding cash reserves. We have shown that this implies that there is
a unique, interior level of demand for cash reserves, which in turn generates a unique stationary
monetary equilibrium.
154 Banking Crises and Welfare
We now turn to the question of how discount window policy affects the frequency and the sever-
ity of banking crises. We continue to focus entirely on stationary monetary equilibria, and hence
maintain the assumption that (13) holds. Recall that a banking crisis occurs whenever movers and
non-movers receive different returns. For all but one policy choice, banking crises will occur in
equilibrium.
Proposition 5 If σR =1holds, then banking crises never occur in equilibrium. If σR>1 holds,
however, then banking crises occur with positive probability in equilibrium.
This result follows directlyfrom Propositions 2and3, using the fact that in a stationary equilibrium
It = σR must hold. When It =1holds, banks will set γt to unity and therefore will have sufﬁcient
cash reserves to meet any level of liquidity demand. When It > 1 holds, on the other hand, banks
will set γt less than unity, and therefore with positive probability the realized value of πt will be
greater than π∗. Because φ > 1 holds, it follows from (7) and (8) that such a value of πt will
necessarily lead to a crisis.
Theseverityof acrisisdepends onthe realizedvalue ofπt and on the interest rate at the discount
window. From Proposition 1 we know that setting φ below R/r guarantees that (costly) liquidation
of investment will never take place. Within this range, φ also determines how distorted the real
allocation of resources can become. From (6) we can calculate the largest possible difference
between the returns given to movers and to non-movers, which is a measure of the maximum













The difference between these two expressions is strictly increasing in φ. In other words, a lower
interest rate on discount window loans implies a better “worst case scenario” in terms of the dis-
tortion of real allocations. This happens because a lower interest rate makes banks more willing to
borrow currency and thereby transfer resources from non-movers to movers during a crisis.
We now turn to the optimal policy question: How should a benevolent government set the
policy pair (σ,φ)? Following Smith [16], we take the objective to be the steady-state utility of
a young agent.
9 W eb e g i nb yd i s c u s s i n gt h e“ ﬁrst-best” allocation in this environment. Consider
9 That is, we ignore the initial old generation in our welfare calculations. See footnote 9 in Smith[16] on this issue.
16the problem of a social planner who directly controls investment and allocation decisions in both
locations and who therefore is essentially unaffected by the relocation friction. It should be clear
that this planner has no use for money and hence will place the total endowment in each period
into storage. When the stored goods mature, the planner will divide the proceeds equally among
the (now-old) agents in each location, regardless of their place of birth. The utility level of a young
agent in this allocation is given by ln(Rw).N o t i c et h a tw ea r enot claiming that this allocation can
be achieved in the decentralized economy with relocation and information frictions. Our intention
here is merely to present this allocation as a useful benchmark.
We now present our main result of this section. While no policy can implement the ﬁrst-best
allocation described above, there are policies that can implement arbitrarily near-by allocations
without introducing indeterminacy of stationary equilibrium.
Proposition 6 For any ε > 0, there exists a policy (σ,φ) such that steady-state welfare in the
unique stationary monetary equilibrium generated by (σ,φ) is within ε of the ﬁrst-best value
ln(Rw).
The proof is contained in the appendix; the intuition is as follows. Getting very close to the ﬁrst-
best allocation requires having nearly all of the economy’s total endowmentp l a c e di n t os t o r a g e .
(so that the value of real money balances held by banks z∗ is close to zero). A bank will only be
willing to hold very little currency if borrowing from the discount window is relatively inexpen-
sive, that is, if φ is very close to unity. In order for a stationary monetary equilibrium to exist and
be unique, we need 1 < σR<φ to hold, and hence for σR to be very close to unity. In the proof




can be constructed so that, along
this sequence, the allocation in the unique stationary monetary equilibrium converges uniformly to
the ﬁrst-best allocation described above. Note that the ﬁrst-best allocation itself cannot be imple-
mented. Achieving the ﬁrst-best allocation requires that all o ft h ee c o n o m y ’ sr e s o u r c e sb ep l a c e d
into storage, which implies that there must be zero demand for cash reserves and hence money
must have no value. When money has no value, discount window lending is clearly ineffective.
What Proposition 6 shows is that a “good” policy in this environment is to make the demand for
cash reserves very small, and to use the discount window to provide almost-costless liquidity.
10
10 The result that having a low interest rate on discount window loans is a good policy is not driven by our assumption
that agents derive no utility from the revenue made by the monetary authority on these loans. Because a low-interest-
rate policy can bring the economy very close to the ﬁrst-best allocation, it is better than a high-interest-rate policy
regardless of how this revenue is used.
17The last statement points out what is perhaps an important distinction between money and
liquidity. Money is an asset that is inherently liquid, but a demand for liquidity does not necessarily
imply a demand for money. In fact, the beneﬁt of having a discount window in this environment
derives precisely from the fact that it helps meet the liquidity needs of relocated agents in a way
that does not prevent socially-productive investments from being undertaken.
11 The non-existence
of an optimal policy comes from the fact that there is no other role for money in this setting. To
demonstrate that this is the case, we now change the investment technology in such a way that
money is useful as a store of value (as in Diamond [6]). We show that, in this case, there is a well-
deﬁned optimal policy and that this policy can be viewed as an implementation of the Friedman
rule.
5 Diminishing Returns and the Friedman Rule
We now change the technology in the model so that there are decreasing returns to investment.
We do this by replacing the storage technology with a production technology that uses capital and
labor as inputs. We should emphasize that the particular way in which we modify the model is not
important for our main message. Any method of introducing diminishing returns to investment that
are “strong enough” will deliver the same result (for example, one could have intra-generational
consumption loans, as in Champ, Smith, and Williamson [5] and Antinolﬁ, Huybens, and Keister
[1]). We have chosen to add production to the model because it entails making minimal modiﬁca-
tions to the basic structure, and because it places the model within the well-known Diamond [6]
framework.
At the beginning of each period, perfectly competitive ﬁrms use capital and labor to produce
output using a constant-returns-to-scale technology
Yt = F (kt,n t),
where kt is total capital input and nt total labor input. The function F satisﬁes the usual concavity
11 In this way, Proposition 6 is closely related to the results of Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Russell[3] on the optimality
of the Friedman rule. They study a model where the fraction of agents relocated is the same in every period and there
is no discount window. They show that, as in Smith [16], a money growth rate rule that leads to a zero nominal
interest rate is not optimal because it generates too little real investment. They then construct a “simulator regime”
policy under which money is valued but holding money does not preclude real investment. Under this regime a zero
nominal interest rate is optimal.
18and Inada conditions. For simplicity, we assume that capital depreciates completely in production.
Agents are no longer endowed with goods; instead, each young agent is endowed with one unit
of time. This time is supplied inelastically as labor, and hence the income of a young agent is
equal to the real wage, denoted by wt. In place of the storage technology used above, one unit
of consumption placed into investment at time t now yields one unit of capital at time t +1 .
The timing of events within a period is the same as that described in Section 2. In particular,
investment decisions must be made before the size of the relocation shock πt is known. Investment
can be liquidated after πt has been realized, in which case it yields r<1 units of consumption.
In all other ways, the model is exactly the same as before. Young agents ﬁnd it optimal to deposit
all of their income in a bank, and the bank places a fraction γt of its portfolio in currency and the
remaining (1 − γt) in investment. The bank’s problem is unchanged. The only real difference that
adding production brings to the model is that the return on investment (as well as the income of
young agents) depends on the aggregate level of investment.
Since the size of the population (and hence of the labor force) is normalized to unity, the equi-
librium factor-pricing relationships can be written as
wt = f (kt) − ktf




where f (kt) ≡ F (kt,1) is the intensive production function and Rt denotes the period-t rental
price of capital. Note that the real return on goods invested in period t is given by Rt+1.
Our goal is to compare the policy prescriptions of this model with those derived for the linear-
storage model in Section 4. For this reason we only consider stationary allocations, which are
easily compared with allocations in the earlier model. We begin by ﬁnding the optimal stationary
allocation, and then we ask if there exists a policy choice under which it is the unique stationary
monetary equilibrium allocation. The exercise is as before: we examine the problem of a social
planner whose objective is to maximize the steady-state utility level of a young agent. We allow
the planner to choose the initial level of the capital stock, and impose the constraint that the level
of capital be the same for all periods.
12 Letting k∗ denote the optimal stationary quantity of capital,
12 We should stress that this emphasis on stationarity is only to facilitate the comparison of allocations in this model
with those in the linear-storage model. If the initial level of capital were ﬁxed arbitrarily, then typically the optimal




In other words, k∗ will be set according to the golden rule, because this plan maximizes the total
amount of consumption available to the planner in each period. The planner will distribute this
consumption exactly the same way as in the earlier model: in each location, the total amount of
consumption available will be divided evenly among the old agents, regardless of their place of
birth. The level of consumption given to each agent will be equal to f (k∗) − k∗. Using (14) and
(15), we can then write the utility level of an agent in this allocation as ln(w(k∗)). Notice that
this is essentially the same expression as that given in Section 4 for the optimal utility level in
the linear-storage model, but with R set to unity. An agent’s consumption is independent of her
relocation status and of πt, and is equal to the value of her young-period endowment multiplied
b yt h er a t eo fr e t u r no ni n v e s t m e n t( R in the linear storage model, unity in the optimal stationary
allocation here).
We now investigate under what conditions this optimal allocation can be implemented as an
equilibrium by the proper choice of monetary policy. The analysis in the previous sections demon-
stratesthatsuchapolicymusthaveφ =1 . Onlywhenborrowingatthediscountwindowiscostless
will banks choose to offer perfect insurance against relocation. Setting φ =1requires setting σ so
that σRt =1holds, and hence our candidate optimal policy is (σ,φ)=( 1 ,1). We now look at the
set of stationary monetary equilibria generated by this policy, under the assumption that the initial
level of the capital stock is given by k∗.
Under the candidate optimal policy, the solution to the bank’s problem is slightly different than
that described in Section 2. The values of αt and λt given in (6) are still an optimal choice.
13
However, the solution to (9), the problem of choosing γt, is now degenerate. Because φ =1
holds, all agents will receive the average return on the bank’s portfolio regardless of the realization
of πt, and hence γt will be chosen to maximize this return. If the optimal stationary allocation is
implemented, then the return on both money and investment will be unity, which means that a bank
will be completely indifferent between any two levels of γt in [0,1]. The equilibrium conditions
allocation would involve growth (or decay) toward a steady state. The results we present below would still hold in
such a setting, but their relationship to the results in Section 4 would be less evident.
13 There are other optimal choices, but they all lead to the same allocation of consumption. For example, the bank
could set αt (π) to zero for all π and pay movers the same real return with currency borrowed from the discount
window, and then use its cash reserves to repay the loan.
20under the candidate optimal policy are therefore (i) a no-arbitrage condition stating that money





and (ii) a materials-balance condition stating that all savings takes place either in money or in
investment
kt+1 + zt = w(kt).






and therefore the equilibrium laws of motion for (kt,z t) are given by
kt+1 = w(kt) − zt
and
zt+1 = f
0 (w(kt) − zt)zt.
It immediately follows from these two expressions that the level of capital in a stationary monetary





and therefore if a stationary monetary equilibrium exists under this policy, it is unique. The answer
to our question of whether or not the policy implements the optimal stationary allocation depends
crucially on the sign of z∗. If z∗ is negative, then
f
0 (w(kt)) > 1
holds. Since w(k∗) is the maximum amount of investment that can occur in equilibrium (when
k∗ is the level of capital), in this case the return on investment is always greater than unity. This
is analogous to the assumption R>1 in the linear-storage model, and implies that money cannot
have value in equilibrium when (σ,φ)=( 1 ,1) holds. As in Section 4, the optimal stationary
allocation cannot be implemented (but policies with φ > 1 can implement arbitrarily nearby allo-
c a t i o n s ) .T h eb a s i cp r o b l e mi st h es a m ea st h a ti d e n t i ﬁe di nt h el i n e a r - s t o r a g em o d e l :T h e r ei sn o
21role for money in the model outside of the provision of liquidity. The optimal allocation requires
that no money be held, but then liquidity cannot be provided through the discount window.
If z∗ is positive, however, then
f
0 (w(kt)) < 1
holds, whichimpliesthatmoneyhasastore-of-valuerole(andpreventscapitalover-accumulation).
14
In the unique stationary monetary equilibrium, both money and capital offer a return of unity and
therefore all agents have a consumption level of w(k∗). Hence in this case the policy (σ,φ)=
(1,1) does implement the optimal stationary allocation. We state this result as our ﬁnal proposi-
tion.
Proposition 7 Deﬁne z∗ as in (16). If z∗ > 0 holds, then the allocation in the unique stationary
monetary equilibrium under the policy (σ,φ)=( 1 ,1) is equal to the optimal stationary allocation.
This result veriﬁes that the non-existence of an optimal policy in Section 4 was caused by the
linearity of the investment technology and the fact that there was no role for money in the model
other than to provide liquidity for relocated agents. If there is a role for money as a store of
value, as in the Diamond-type model presented above, then costless liquidity can be provided at
the discount window without undermining the demand for cash reserves, and an optimal policy
does exist. This optimal policy can be viewed as an implementation of the Friedman rule, where
currency and investment offer the same return and banks are given access to costless liquidity
through the discount window. This policy does not lead to indeterminacy of stationary equilibrium
because only one level of real investment (k∗) will lead to the rate of return required for banks to
b ew i l l i n gt oh o l db o t ha s s e t s .
6 Concluding Remarks
We have presented a general equilibrium model in which discount window lending is a use-
ful policy tool for attenuating the effects of systemic banking crises. The previous literature has
focused on lending at a zero nominal interest rate, and shown how such lending can prevent real
allocations from becoming distorted during periods of high liquidity demand. However, Smith
[16] identiﬁed a source of instability associated with the free provision of liquidity: indetermi-
nacy of stationary equilibrium. The environment presented in Section 2 is one where, as in Smith
14 A positive value of z∗ is analogous to having a “Samuelson case” economy as deﬁned by Gale [12],w h i l ea
negative value is analogous to having a “classical case” economy.
22[16], a policy of freely providing discount window loans at a zero nominal interest rate leads to a
continuum of stationary equilibria, each with a different level of real investment. Our main result
is that, in this environment, charging a penalty rate on discount window loans leads to a unique
stationary equilibrium in which money has value. In other words, much of the beneﬁto fh a v i n g
an elastic currency can be obtained without generating indeterminacy, provided that the discount
window lends at above-market rates. Such a penalty-rate policy does lead to the occurrence of
banking crises in equilibrium, but by setting a small enough penalty the monetary authority can
make both the probability of a crisis occurring in each period and the welfare loss when a crisis
occurs arbitrarily small. In addition, we showed that an important source of the indeterminacy of
stationary equilibrium that arises under a costless-liquidity policy is the linearity in the investment
technology. When investment instead displays decreasing returns to scale and money has a store-
of-value role, providing liquidity at a zero nominal interest rate allows the economy to achieve the
ﬁrst-best allocation as the unique stationary monetary equilibrium. In this case the optimal policy
is a combination of the Friedman rule and a free-liquidity regime at the discount window.
The speciﬁc policy prescriptions of our analysis obviously depend on the speciﬁcf e a t u r e so f
the environment that we consider. In particular, the only uncertainty in our model is about liquidity
demand. There is no uncertainty about the real value of a bank’s assets or a bank’s ability to
repay a discount window loan. An interesting question concerns the optimal lending policy when
the economy is also affected by solvency shocks,
15 and whether or not such shocks would lead to
a strictly positive penalty rate being optimal. If the optimal discount window policy involves a
positive penalty rate, the optimal money-growth rate may differ from the Friedman rule. Another
important friction that is absent from our framework is asymmetric information. It is often pointed
out that the presence of lender of last resort services may generate moral hazard, resulting in
excessive risk taking by banks and therefore greater uncertainty about a bank’s ability to repay the
loan.
16 Again, it would be interesting to see if such a change in the environm e n tw o u l dl e a dt oa n
optimal policy that involves charging a strictly positive penalty rate on discount window loans. We
leave these questions for future research.
15 In a different environment, Freeman [10] studies this problem and ﬁnds that a zero-nominal-rate lending policy
should be combined with quantity restrictions at the discount window. See also Antinolﬁ, Huybens, and Keister [1]
on the role of quantity restrictions.
16 Williamson [18] studies a model in which there is moral hazard and shows that in this setting discount window
lending at a zero nominal interest rate is welfare improving.
23Appendix A. Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1: If φ <R / rholds, then the solution to (5) has δt =0for all values of γt and πt. If
φ >R / rholds, then the solution to (5) has λt =0for all values of γt and πt.
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(1 − αt)γt +( 1− δt)(1− γt)It − λtφ
. (A-3)
Suppose that φ <R / rholds. For the solution to have δt > 0, we need (A-2) to be non-negative.
However, this would imply that both (A-1) and (A-3) are strictly positive, and therefore that the
solution must have αt and λt at their maximum possible values. In other words, it must be the case
that no resources are kept for non-movers, so that dt =0holds. Given this, it is straightforward to
show that dm
t is strictly decreasing in δt (because an increase in liquidation implies a corresponding
decrease in discount window borrowing, and liquidation is more costly). Therefore, the solution
cannot have δt > 0.
Now suppose that φ >R / rholds. For the solution to have λt > 0, we need (A-3) to be non-
negative. This would imply that both (A-1) and (A-2) are strictly positive, and therefore that the
solution must have αt =1and δt =1 . H o w e v e r ,t h eb a n kw o u l dt h e nh a v en or e s o u r c e sl e f ta t
time t+1with which to repay the loan, and therefore the upper bound on λt would be zero. Hence
the solution cannot have λt > 0. ¥
Proposition 2: For any given φ ∈ (1,R/r) and any It > 0, the bank’s problem has a unique
solution. The reserve-deposit ratio γφ in this solution is a continuous function of It and satisﬁes:
(a) γφ (It)=1for It ≤ 1,
(b) γφ (It)=0for It ≥ φ, and
(c) γ0
φ (It) < 0 for It ∈ (1,φ).
Proof: We know from Proposition 1 that in this case δt =0holds for all πt.L e tM (γt,I t) denote
the objective function in (9). We begin by establishing part (c). The solution to the bank’s problem
24is implicitly deﬁned by the necessary (and sufﬁcient) condition
M1 (γt,I t)=0 .
In addition, concavity of the objective function with respect to γt implies that, at the solution,
M11 (γt,I t) < 0
must hold. The ﬁrst-order condition can be re-written in the form
γt = π




where the functions π∗ and π∗∗ a r ea sd e ﬁned in (7) and (8).The effect of a change in It on the
optimal value of γt is determined by implicit differentiation of the identity
M1 (γ (It),I t) ≡ 0,
which yields
M11 (γ (It),I t)
dγ (It)
dIt





M12 (γ (It),I t)
M11 (γ (It),I t)
.
We know that M11 (γ (It),I t) < 0 must hold at the solution to the problem. In addition, writing
the ﬁrst derivative of the objective in the form (A-4) and then differentiating with respect to It, we
obtain
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25holds, and part (c) of the proposition is veriﬁed.
Next, consider again the ﬁrst-order condition
M1 (γ (It),I t) ≡
γt
γt +( 1− γt) It
φ




Rewrite the equation as
M1 (γ (It),I t) ≡
1
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holds. We therefore have
lim

















O fc o u r s e ,w em u s ts t i l lh a v e
lim
γt→1M1 (1,I t)=0 ,
26which implies that It =1must hold. Hence, we have established γ (1) = 1. In addition, the
(negative) monotonicity of γt with respect to It implies that γ (It)=1also holds for all values of
It ≤ 1. This completes the proof of part (a).

















































































This equation immediately implies that It = φ must hold. Thus we have shown that γ (φ)=0
holds, and monotonicity of γt with respect to It implies that γ (It)=0also holds for all It ≥ φ.
This proves part (b) and completes the proof of the proposition. ¥
Proposition 6: For any ε > 0, there exists a policy (σ,φ) such that steady-state welfare in the
unique stationary equilibrium generated by (σ,φ) is within ε of the ﬁrst-best value ln(Rw).




j=1 of discount-window interest rates such that 1 < φj <R / rholds













For each j, ﬁnd the money growth rate σj that would lead banks to choose γj as their reserve-
27deposit ratio. That is, choose σj to satisfy
γφj (σjR)=γj.
From Proposition 2 we know that such a value of σj always exists. Furthermore, because γj is
strictly between zero and unity, we must have
1 < σjR<φj
for all j, and therefore the sequence {σj} must converge to 1/R.



























hold for all πt ∈ [0,1]. These two expressions show that as γj converges to zero and φ to unity,
the functions dm
t and dt both converge uniformly to the constant function R. This implies that





ln(Rw), which establishes the result. ¥
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